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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
GNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, 
Plalintiff-Appellant, 
-vs.-
EL PASO NATURAL GAS 
COMPANY, 
Def endQIY/,t-Respondent. 
Case 
No.10361 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for indemnity brought under the 
specific terms and provisions of a written deed which, 
having been accepted, became an agreement to indemnify. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court below granted defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and simultaneously denied plain-
tiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of 
Liability. From the summary judgment of "no cause 
of action'' thereupon entered against plaintiff, and as-
serting also that the trial court erred in denying plain-
2 
tiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Lia-
bility, plaintiff now appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks (a) reversal of the summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant; an.d (b) judgment in faYor 
of plaintiff as a. matter of law on the issue of defendant's 
legal liability to indemnify plaintiff, leaving to appro-
priate disposition in a trial court the question of the 
amount of defendant's liability to plaintiff; or ( c) fail-
ing (b) above, and in the event this court disagrees with 
our view that there is no dispute herein as to any ma-
terial fact, then a trial of this case on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case having been resolved in the trial court by 
a summary judgment against plaintiff, without trial or 
findings of fact or jury verdict, appellant now states 
the facts as established by the pleadings, by responses 
to written interrogatories and requests for admissions, 
and by stipulation. There is no major dispute between 
the parties as to the facts of this case material to this 
appeal; and we think no dispute at all. But it should 
be noted that the disposition made of this case in the 
lower court by Summary Judgment requires that the 
facts be viewed in the way most favorable to appellant, 
not respondent. This is necessarily true because the trial 
court's ruling, in effect, was that plaintiff could not re-
cover even if the facts were viewed in their aspect roost 
favorable to appellant. 
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The pertinent background facts in this case are these. 
In the year 1955, Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corpora-
tion (hereinafter referred to as P. N.), a corporation of 
Delaware, decided to embark upon the very substantial 
enterprise of building and operating a 22" gas pipeline 
running for several hundred miles across major portions 
of at least the States of Wyoming and Idaho. The pros-
pective route of this proposed pipeline was, in some lo-
cations, roughly parallel and close to the railroad right 
of way and tracks of appellant, Union Pacific Railroad 
Company (hereinafter sometimes referred to as U. P.); 
in other places, it crossed that right of way and those 
tracks; and in places, it crossed other lands owned by 
r. P. which were and are separate and distinct from its 
railroad right of way. In the summer of 1955, repre-
sentatives of P. N. approached representatives of U. P. 
to ascertain whether or not, and if so on what terms, 
U. P. would convey to or contract with P. N. so as to 
transfer sufficient real property interests owned by U. P. 
and desired by P. N. for the construction and operation 
of that pipeline. U. P. advised P. N., in substance, that 
it was reluctant to enter into the proposed transactions 
at all; but that it would do so. But, simultaneously, U. P. 
also advised P. N. that U. P. was at that time exposed 
to no risks of any kind whatever on account of any such 
proposed pipeline simply because no such pipeline then 
existed; that the conveyances, contracts, or instruments 
which U. P. would execute to convey or to create the 
contractual or property interests P. N. desired would be 
designed to insure that U. P. would be fully protected 
against risks or exposure to risks which would be created 
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or arise by virtue of the construction or the existence 
and operation of the pipeline; that the liability prov]. 
sions of these instruments would be strict; and that r p 
expected, desired, and intended to be in precisely as good 
a situation, under the terms of the instruments, aftor 
the pipeline was constructed as it then was before tht 
pipeline was constructed, with ref ere nee to exposure tn 
possible risks of financial cost and loss. In short, r. P. 
informed P. N. that, as between the two, all risks re-
sulting from P. N. 's enterprise were to be borne by P. ~. 
P. N. was willing to accept the real property interest' 
it desired on the basis described above, perhaps because 
of the very moderate prices to be charged by U. P. for 
the interests transferred. 
Among the many real property interests desired hy 
P. N. were perpetual easements for the pipeline over file 
separate parcels of property located in Lincoln County, 
Wyoming. These easements over these five parcels later 
became the subject of the one deed specifically invoh·ed 
in this case. The wording of the other instruments or 
conveyances by which P. N. acquired numerous other 
property interests from U. P. have no pertinency to the 
exact issues involved in this action. However, the fact 
of their existence does demonstrate the over-all mag-
nitude of P. N. 's pipeline project, clearly outlines the 
total relationship between these two parties, and e\'i-
dences the comprehensive and fundamental purpose for 
the indemnity provision contained in the deed which i~ 
involved here. It need scarcely be added that said mag-
nitude, relationship and purpose illuminate sharply what 
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appellant contends is the proper interpretation of the 
indemnity provision which is the precise problem before 
this court on this appeal. 
By an exchange of correspondence U. P. twice sub-
mitted to P. N. for consideration a draft or form of 
<leed containing the precise wording of the indemnity 
proYisiou lT. P. desired used in the deed referred to 
ahon' : and after a lengthy time affording full opportu-
nity for consideration, P. N. expressly approved that 
wording. The deed was then prepared in final form; and 
on about l\Iarch 13, 1956, was executed by U. P. and de-
li\·ered to and accepted by P. N. Subsequently, that deed 
ll'as recorded by P. N. Thereafter, P. N. constructed the 
pipeline and operated it for several years. All of the 
foregoing is shown, without quali:fica ti on, by paragraph 
2 of plaintiff's complaint (R. 2); defendant's answer to 
paragraph 2 of that complaint (R. 24); plaintiff's re-
sp-0nse to defendant's request for admission No. 9, with 
the three exhibits referred to therein and attached (R. 
49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 57 and 58) ; and by a specific stipulation 
of counsel for both parties hereto to the effect that the 
facts sho""Il by all responses to requests for admissions 
or answers to interrogatories then on file should and 
would be considered as though established by affidavits 
(unless contradicted by opposing affidavits of which none 
"'ere filed.) made in support of the Motions for Summary 
Judgment. Facts thus established were to be taken by 
the trial court (and for that matter by this court) as 
proved in deciding the merits of those motions. (R. 164.) 
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On December 31, 1959, a corporate merger was ac-
complished whereby P. N. was merged into El Paso Nat-
ural Gas Company (hereinafter sometimes referred to 
as El Paso), defendant herein. El Paso succeeded to ali 
legal rights and assets of P. N. and likewise assumed all 
legal and contractual obligations of P. N. For purpost>s 
of this case, El Paso therefore stands in the exaet place 
of and is the same precise legal entity as was P. X. El 
Paso has since then to this day owned and operated the 
pipeline, accepting the benefits of and utilizing the ea8e-
ments conveyed by the deed mentioned abon; and so 
admits. (R. 1, 24.) 
On November 30, 1963, John E. Stacey, Jr. (herein-
after ref erred to as Stacey), an employee of El Paso, was 
driving a truck owned by El Paso in the course and sropt> 
of his employment by El Paso. He was traveling to a 
section of the pipeline located on one or more of the ease-
ment areas specifically described in the deed here in-
volved. While so engaged, he was hideously injured in 
an accident occurring on a road crossing over def end-
ant 's tracks, which crossing plaintiff contends was a pri-
vate and not a public one. (Here is an example of a fact 
which, if disputed by defendant and if material, must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to appellant.) The 
accident occurred when the truck was struck on the eross-
ing, in Wyoming, by one of Union Pacific's trains. 
Stacey's injuries need not be described in detail here. 
Suffice it to say he is, for all practical purposes, a hope-
less quadriplegic. In 1964 Stacey and his wife broug-ht 
a negligence personal injury suit against U. P. in the 
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Federal District Court for Utah seeking damages of 
,rell over one million dollars. U. P. tendered defense of 
that lawsuit to El Paso, specifically relying upon the in-
demnity provision of the deed hereafter to be quoted ver-
hatim. El Paso declined that tender. Union Pacific 
thereupon itself conducted the defense of Stacey's law-
suit until shortly before the trial date set in that case; 
an<l at that point in Stacey's suit, U. P. settled with the 
Stacey's for a total payment of $340,000. Union Pacific 
incurred expenses of $4, 707.82 in conducting the defense 
of Stacey's suit to and including settlement thereof. All 
of the foregoing facts, except the amount of U. P. 's de-
fense expense, have been admitted by El Paso. (R. 2, 3, 
4, 24, 25.) In fairness it should be noted El Paso denies 
that settlement was a reasonable one or that it was made 
by U. P. in good faith. But those denials are imma-
terial to the indemnity liability issue in the case now 
before this court because defendant has conceded U. P. 
necessarily incurred at least some loss and expense due 
to the Stacey's lawsuit (R. 64); and this court is not pre-
sented on this appeal with any question involving the 
amount of defendant's liability to plaintiff. The only issue 
before this court is whether or not there is such indem-
nity liability at all. 
In late 1964 U. P. brought the instant action against 
El Paso to recover indemnity under the deed. Proced-
urally the case reaches this court as the result of a some-
what unusual course of events. Defendant had answered 
U. P.'s complaint; and discovery procedures were being 
invoked by both parties. During the course of those dis-
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covery procedures, U. P. submitted certain interroga. 
tories and requests for admissions to defendant. To part 
thereof defendant objected. When the defendant's ob-
jections came on for hearing, Judge Ellett indicated at 
the outset of the proceeding he believed defendant should 
not be required to respond further in the discovery pro-
cedure because he viewed the case as one in which plain-
tiff could not prevail. For this reason, he iBvited d ... 
fendant to file a motion for summary judgment. .At coun-
sel's request, plaintiff was permitted to file its own ~lo­
tion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liahilit>·· 
In order to supply the trial court a factual foundation 
upon which to consider those motions, it was stipulatetl 
that the answers to interrogatories or responses to re-
quests for admissions already filed were to be considered 
effective in support of the motions as though the subject 
of specific affidavits filed for that purpose. (R. 164.) The 
motions for summary judgment were then heard by 
Judge Ellett, who granted defendant's motion, simulta-
neously denied plaintiff's motion, and entered summary 
judgment in favor of defendant. (R. 138, 136.) In dr-
fense of the length of the foregoing statement of tl1 i: 
general facts of this case, we respectfully submit the sit-
uation is a complex one scarcely capable of too brief 
description. 
The very specific facts here involved are these. The 
deed referred to, in addition to conveying the easement 
interests, provided in material part as follows: 
'' * * * together with the right of ingress and 
egress to, from and upon said strips of ]and for 
--
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the purpose of exercising the rights herein grant-
ed• • •." (R. 9.) 
It also provided as to indemnity as follows: 
"The party of the second part ( P. N.) by the 
acceptance of this deed agrees to indemnify and 
save harmless the party of the first part (U. P.) 
from and against any and all liability, loss, dam-
age, claims, demands, actions, causes of action, 
costs, and expenses of whatsoever nature, includ-
ing court costs and attorneys' fees, growing out 
of injury or harm to or death of persons whom-
soever, or loss or destruction of or damage to 
property whatsoever, including the pipe line of 
the party of the second part, when such injury, 
harm, death, loss, destruction or damage, how-
soever caused, grows out of or arises from the 
hursting of or leaks in the pipe line, or in any 
other way whatsoever is due to or arises because 
of the existence of the pipe line or the construc-
tion, operation, maintenance, repair, renewal, re-
construction or use of the pipe line or any part 
thereof, or to the contents therein or therefrom." 
(R. 10.) 
At the time of this accident, Stacey had one and only 
one reason for being where he was. He was then directly 
en route to one of the easement areas described in the 
deed to engage in work which, while being performed, 
plainly amounted to "maintenance" of the pipeline. 
Plaintiff so alleged (R. 2, 3); and, in substance, defend-
ant so conceded. (R. 158, 159.) Plaintiff also alleged, and 
ean prove if this court's opinion makes the fact signifi-
cant, that Stacey was, in effect, engaged in the process of 
"maintaining" the pipeline at the precise moment of his 
accident (R. 3). Plaintiff's allegation in this regard is 
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based on the admitted fact that Stacey was actuallv 
guiding maintenance men employed by a contractor of 
El Pa.so's to the pipeline when he was injured (R. 60); 
and upon the provable fact that Stacey and those ar·-
companying him were actually transporting tools and 
equipment to the pipeline to be used in its maintenancp 
at the moment he was hurt. (R. 126.) 
The crossing where Stacey's accident oceurred is , 
to be sure, some short distance from the pipeline itself 
and from the easement areas described in the deed. Plain-
tiff has always conceded the accident did not happen on 
one of those specific easement areas. (R. 5, 6, 7, 164.) But 
it is also established in this case that use of the crossing 
where the accident occurred afforded Stacey and the dP-
f endant the only reasonably practical route over whieh 
Stacey or defendant could operate an automobile or 
truck to reach at least one easement area which was de-
scribed in the deed and to which Stacey was directly en 
route when injured. (R. 47, 164.) Stacey's aceident and 
use by El Paso of the easement areas and of the pipeline 
were, to borrow a phrase which this court has heard or 
read before, "inseparably related to one another in time 
and space." Coray, Adm. v. Southern Pacific Co., :135 U.S. 
520, at page 524; 69 Sup. Ct. 275; 93 L.Ed. 208. 
ARGUMENT 
PRELil\IINARY STATEMENT 
Since the defendant asserted four separate reasons 
or grounds for its Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
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the trial court below simply granted that motion without 
stating which of defendant's reasons or grounds it ac-
cepted as sufficient to justify the court's action, appellant 
must necessarily address its brief to all four of those 
possible reasons for granting that motion. It should be 
noted at this point that the four basic ideas or contentions 
relied upon by defendant and embodied in the four sepa-
rateh' numbered paragraphs of its motion best lend them-
se!Yes to intelligent analysis and discussion when or-
ganized in a slightly different order and form than the 
paragraphing of that motion would dictate. But the sub-
stauce of each of defendant's theories will be fully dealt 
with herein. Additionally, we mention again that plain-
tiff contends the trial court erred not only when it grant-
ed defendant's motion, but also that it erred when it 
denied plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
Issue of Liability. (R. 78, 138.) To present its position in 
both of these respects, appellant will here state its points 
affirmatively in support of its own motion, rather than 
negatively to challenge defendant's motion. So organ-
ized and stated, plaintiff's argument herein nevertheless 
directly meets and answers every possible basis for the 
trial court's granting of a Summary Judgment in El 
Paso's favor. 
POINT I 
THE INDEMNITY PROVISION OF THE 
DEED WAS INTENDED TO PROVIDE IN-
DEMNITY TO UNION PACIFIC UNDER 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF STACEY'S 
ACCIDENT; THAT ACCIDENT WAS "DUE 
TO" AND "DID ARISE BECAUSE OF" 
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THE EXISTENCE, MAINTENANCE AND 
USE OF THE PIPELINE; AND WHETHER 
OR NOT THE EXISTENCE, OPERATION 
MAINTENANCE OR USE OF THE PIPE~ 
LINE WAS A "PROXIMATE CAUSE'' OF 
STACEY'S ACCIDENT IS COMPLETELY 
IRRELEVANT. 
Consideration of the several facets of this point to-
gether seems to appellant appropriate because those 
facets are so related to each other as to make separate 
discussion thereof virtually impossible. That corniidera-
tion must be initiated by careful examination of the in-
demnity language relied upon hy appellant. To simplify 
that examination, to emphasize the significant wording. 
and to eliminate some portions of the wording which have 
no real pertinency to this particular case, appellant no"· 
sets forth a distillation of the indemnity provision of 
the deed in which the names of the current parties re-
place terms such as party of the first part and party of 
the second part, and in which phrases having special im-
portance are italicized as follows: 
El Paso agrees to indemnify U. P. from all lia-
bility, loss and expenses of whatsoever n.aturr, 
growing out of injury to persons u·homsoerer, 
when such injury, hou_;soever caused, in any u·~y 
whatsoever is due to or arises because of the en~­
tence of the pipeline or its operation or mainte-
nance. 
'\Ve respectfully submit that the distilled statement 
set forth above, when compared against the full text of 
the indemnity language of the deed, is a faithful repro-
duction equivalent to quotation of what that deed says 
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insofar as the words are of consequence to this particular 
case. (R. 10.) Union Pacific intended that language to 
protect it against prospective losses which both parties 
to the deed realized might some day occur because of 
an enormous ne-w enterprise then about to be undertaken 
by P. N. (now El Paso). Whatever El Paso's counsel 
may now say as to the intent of their client, surely El 
Pa~o must be held to have intended to agree to indem-
nify e. P. to the full natural extent of the meaning that 
language conveys. 0. S. L. Railroad Co. v. Idaho Stock-
yards Co., 12 U. (2d) 205; 364 P. (2d) 826. And if that 
language, fairly read, does not say El Paso accepts, as 
between itself and U. P., the new risks which El Paso's 
pipeline enterprise and its juxtaposition to U. P. railroad 
operations 'vould inevitably create, then the English lan-
guage is inadequate to perform that function. Judged 
against the perspective and background out of which the 
language was born, there should be no doubt the parties 
to this case said, and meant to say, the cost of new risks 
inevitably incident to El Paso's new enterprise, and fair-
ly related to or connected with it, were to be a part of the 
oYer-all cost of that enterprise to be borne by El Paso. 
El Pa.so's counsel now contend that company did not 
agree to indemnify U. P. against losses due to the exis-
tence of the pipeline or its use, operation and mainte-
nance unless such losses were· "proximately caused" 
thereby. That contention is untenable. Independent of 
authorities which will hereinafter be cited, it should be 
obsernd the language used demonstrates in and of itself 
that it was not intended to describe any concept of 
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"proximate cause" or "legal ca use," and cannot be so 
understood. "Proximate ca use" or "legal ca use" are 
phrases which, as every first-year law student learns , 
connote and describe very real and important limitations 
on the common garden variety concept known as ''cause.,, 
Phrases such as "howsoever caused" and "in any other 
way whatsoever due to or arising because of," which are 
used in this deed, are utterly inconsistent and irrecon-
cilable with notions of legal limitations and teclmical re-
strictions implict in the terms "proximate ca use" or 
"legal cause." Therefore, whatever else may have heen 
meant by these parties when they used the terms "howso-
ever caused" and "in any other way whatsoever," it i~ 
plain the parties did not intend to describe a concept 
synonomous with proximate cause. 
It remains then to consider what type of connection 
between the pipeline and a loss was intended to be de-
scribed by the parties to the deed when the words chosen 
were selected for use. We respectfully assert that the 
plain import of those words was to describe pretty closely 
the concept or idea which is sometimes ref erred to in le-
gal circles as "cause in fact." Cause in fact is not, in 
truth, a strictly legal concept at all. It is instead a con-
cept involving practical analysis of whatever natural re-
lationship exists between two or more events or phenom-
ena eneountered by ordinary people in their everyday 
lives. The question of whether or not a stated event or 
phenomenon, ''A,'' was due to or caused hy a different 
event or phenomenon, '' B,'' is answered by ordinary 
men in light of their experience since birth through ap-
15 
plication of the well known ''but for'' test. In other 
words, if any man wishes to answer for himself the ques-
tion as to whether or not A was caused by B, he con-
sciously or unconsciously asks himself: But for B would 
A have occurred? If his answer to himself is no, then 
he considers B was or is a cause in fact of A. Conversely 
put, in those circumstances, he considers A was due to or 
occurred because of B. An analysis of this sort does not 
involve legal precepts; it only involves consideration of 
the actual relationship between two different events or 
phenomena as judged by the experience of a man or of 
mankind. 
Plaintiff does not here dispute nor quarrel with the 
truism that tort law does not decide questions of legal 
liability, involving problems of so-called "proximate 
cause" or "legal cause," simply by resorting to a "but 
for'' or cause in fact test. But that truism is neither 
relevant to the problem of this case nor helpful to this 
court, for plaintiff here does not seek to impose some 
species of tort liability on this defendant. Instead, plain-
tiff asks the court to impose on defendant an entirely 
different kind of liability of a contractual nature which 
clef endant expressly agreed to assume by accepting the 
deed here involved and utilizing the benefits it conveyed. 
To illustrate the point we are trying to make we ask the 
court to consider the following hypothetical situation. X 
hits Y with a club, thereby killing Y. Y is the father of 
a son, Z, two months of age, whom Y has been supporting 
and to whom it is entirely expectable Y would continue 
to furnish support if he lived. Deprived of Y's support, 
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Z starves to death. Any lawyer would quickly recognize 
that X's a.ct in hitting Y with a. club was not a "legal" 
or "proximate" cause of Z's death by starvation. Ar·. 
cordingly, there would be no tort liability in the courts 
of this country against X on account of Z 's death. But 
if in the situation or example set forth above, X had Yo]. 
untarily entered into a valid agreement with someone 
to pay for all losses of every kind whatsoever whidi 
were in fact caused by his hitting Y with a club, then a 
different problem arises. We respectfully submit it does 
not take legal genius, only common sense and experience, 
to understa.nd and conclude that, as a matter of aetual 
fa.ct, indeed as a matter of cause and consequence, X's 
act in hitting Y with a club did play some part in causin~ 
Z 's death; and that the pa.rt played by X's act in hitting 
Y is, consistent with the ordinary meaning of English 
words or language as understood by ordinary men, prop-
erly describable with reference to Z's death in general 
terms of cause and effect such as "due to" or "arising 
because of." 
One dictionary definition of the word "cause", which 
word has many meanings, is ''that which ocrasions a re-
sult." One synonym for "cause" according to the dic-
tionary is "reason"; another is "motive." These words 
connote or describe intangible ideas, not acts or thin!t's. 
For that matter "negligence" is an idea, not merely an 
act or a thing. Negligence can be found from an act 
or from an omission to act, but it is more than the act or 
omission; it is a characterization of the quality of an 
act or omission, certainly an intangible thing. Yet, 
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neither laymen nor lawyers nor judges have any intel-
lectual problem or difficulty in thinking or speaking of 
such intangibles as the cause of whatever particular re-
8ult ensues. When therefore it is necessary to decide what 
the parties to this deed meant when they said "due to 
or arises because of,'' why should the situation be 
thought difficult¥ The sole reason, the sole motive, the 
sole cause for Stacey's activities and presence on plain-
tiff's track at the time of the accident was the pipeline 
of the defendant, its existence, its operation, its use and 
maintenance. Any difficulty in recognizing that some re-
lationship of ordinary cause and effect did exist as be-
tween the existence of that pipeline on the one hand, and 
Stacey's accident with its consequential loss to Union 
Pacific on the other, is based solely on an acquired pre-
disposition of lawyers to think of cause or connection be-
tween two related factors in terms of proximate cause. 
But application of any such acquired and myopic predis-
position when interpreting the language of the deed in 
this case is fallacious, for the parties did not think, speak, 
or agree as to indemnity in terms of proximate cause. 
To the contrary, when speaking of the type of injury or 
ac('ident as to which indemnity was to be paid by El 
Paso, the parties used the words : ''howsoever caused.'' 
The task before this court is to determine what the 
parties to the deed meant by the language they used, not 
some language El Paso's counsel now use. Viewed in 
the light suggested by the foregoing, the plaintiff re-
spectfully submits that in plain fact, and as a matter of 
the relationship between two or more phenomena or 
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events, the existence of the pipeline and the work or ta~k 
of operating, using, and maintaining it were im;eparabh· 
connected with Stacey's injuries in the sense of the woni~ 
used in the need. True, neither the existence of the pipe. 
line nor its maintenance and use "caused" Staeey's in-
jury in a fault or negligence sense. But what of it~ It 
is equally true that the activities of El Paso with refer-
ence to the pipeline put Stacey in the path of plaintiff's 
train; and in every prartical sense, that pipeline and El 
Paso's operations ·with reference to it were at least a 
cause of Stacey's injuries. ''But for'' the pipeline, it5 
maintenance, use and operation, Stacey would not eren 
have been where he was at the time of his injury. In 
common sense, can it be gainsaid that Stacey's injuries, 
"howsoever caused" were "in any way whatsoenr'' 
"due to" the existence of the pipeline? Or "arose be-
cause of" that existence? The view that his injuries were 
not "due to" the "existence" of the pipeline is inex-
plicable unless one imports to the italicized ·words some 
purely legalistic meaning foreign to common understand-
ing. If a history teacher told her third grade class the 
Second World War was, in part, due to or arose beca1tsl' 
of the existence of the Nazi party, could the English 
teacher validly question the statement as inaccurate be-
cause "due to" or "arose because of" require a closer 
relationship than in fact existed? 
It should be noted here that plaintiff is not re-
quired, in order to prevail, to make or assert the extreme 
contention that every conceivable or fanciful cause in 
fact connection between the pipeline and the accident 
would be sufficient to entitle plaintiff to invoke the in-
demnity prov1s1on. Perhaps, because the language of 
the instrument is broad, plaintiff could contend for and 
establish just such an extreme position; but plaintiff need 
not and does not go so far. We do undertake to say 
thr connection in the case at bar between El Paso's pipe-
line and Stacey's accident was real, close and direct. It 
was not imaginary, theoretical, or doubtful. 
In this connection we also ask the court to consider 
the factual background out of which the deed was given. 
That situation has been described at the beginning of 
this brief (largely from plaintiff's response to defend-
ant's request for admission No. 9 (R. 49, 50, 51). By 
virtue of the stipulation between the parties referred to 
aboYe, the facts shown in that response are before this 
court established beyond dispute. It will be noted there-
from that before defendant's pipeline existed it was the 
Railroad Company's happy situation fbat it was exposed 
to no hazards whatever arising by virtue of the pipeline, 
plainly and simply because the pipeline did not exist. 
Plaintiff was willing to convey the property interests 
defendant desired only upon such terms as would protect 
the Railroad Company against risk of loss thereafter oc-
curring due in any fair sense to the construction or even 
the existence of the pipeline. That purpose was com-
municated to defendant and accepted by it. The language 
<leYised for use in the deed was designed and intended 
to accomplish that end. Within the limitations for con-
H'ying human thought which English or any other lan-
guag-e hears, that concept was expressed. In substance, 
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the language used in the deed said that it did not matter 
who was injured, how that person was injured, or wheth-
er or not that injury was caused by conduct or even mis-
conduct of the Railroad Company; but that, neverthr-
less, El Paso should bear the cost of whatever risks 
the existence of the pipeline or El Paso's activities i11 
building, maintaining or using it might play some part 
in producing. The men who made that arrangement 
were thinking in terms of new risks and hazards whieh 
the pipeline would create. They were not concerned 
with "proximate cause", "legal cause" or "fault." Can 
it honestly be disputed that the activities of El Paso in 
constructing its pipeline parallel and close to plaintiff's 
tracks so that, of necessity, El Paso's employes had to 
cross Union Pacific's tracks to get to that portion of 
the pipeline located on the property covered by the deed 
in order to use and maintain the pipeline, did not appre-
ciably increase the risk of some accident resulting in 
loss to the Railroad Company1 Obviously, El Paso's 
activities increased that risk, if for no other reason, 
simply by expanding the number of people who would 
from time to time be on or around plaintiff's tracks. 
We respectfully submit it was precisely to protect Union 
Pacific against whatever augmented risk the mere exis-
tence of the pipeline created in that or any other way 
that the language used in the deed was inserted therein; 
and we also respectfully submit that a man, employed 
by defendant, whose only reason for crossing plaintiff's 
tracks was furnished exclusively by the existenee and 
maintenance of the pipeline, constituted one of the pre-
cise risks El Paso was willing to accept in order to obtain, 
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C'heaply and voluntarily given rather than expensively and 
involuntarily condemned, real property of the plaintiff. 
The foregoing suggests what we submit is a reason-
able yardstick by which to measure the meaning of the 
words of the deed and the intent of the parties evi-
denced thereby. That yardstick is not one of "proxi-
mate cause." It is instead one of risks or hazards fairly 
connected with the sheer existence of the pipeline. Those 
risks and hazards the pipeline created for the first time 
were to be covered by indemnity. Stacey's accident was 
the result of one such risk or hazard. With all due re-
spect to defendant's counsel, and to the trial court, we 
~ay to this court that to relieve this defendant of the 
C'ontractual duty it voluntarily assumed because of some 
unwarranted reluctance to interpret the deed exactly as 
it reads and exactly as it was intended, is indefensible 
in law and morals. The red herring of "proximate cause" 
should not deceive this court. 
The views stated above are supported by the pre-
cise analyses and thoughtful considerations of many care-
ful judges. Please see .Ala. G. S. R. Co. v. L. & N. R. Co. 
(1955) 127 F. Supp. 363; and the appellate decision in 
the same case, 224 F. (2d) 1. The language used by 
Judge Lynne, commencing at page 369 of the F. Supp. 
C'ited, is especially appropriate here. Indeed, it is so 
exactly applicable to the problem here it deserves quota-
tion at some length. 
''A. Proximate Cause 
''Pressing vigorously at the threshold, def end-
an t argues persuasively that the phraseology of 
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paragraph 4 of the agreement, 'which may be i11 _ 
curred or, su.stained by r~ason of such trains being 
detoured is the equivalent of 'proximatr/11 
caused by' the operation of the detouring traii;, 
It is not oversimplification to observe that, if dP-
f enda.nt should prevail upon this insistence, the 
case would be at an end, since the incident oh-
viously occurred because of improper operation 
by plaintiff not of the detouring train, hut of a 
Home Company train. 
"The argument is supported by citation of 
cases translating the phrase, 'by reason of,' and 
phrases of similar import to mean 'proximately 
caused by.' It is no doubt true that in some cir-
cumstances this equivalence of meaning may ob-
tain. However, in construing a contract it is im-
prudent to wrench clauses and phrases from con-
text or to disregard the nature of the instrument, 
the condition of the parties and the objects they 
had in view. (citing cases) 
''Here, the words, 'by reason of such trains 
being detoured,' are immediately followed by the 
expression, 'in ichatever manner the same may be 
caused or occasioned, whether by or through the 
negligence of the Home Company, its agents or 
servants, or by reason of defects in tracks, struc-
tures, or facilities furnished by the Home Com-
pany, or otherwise.' Entered into between t:ro 
corporations moving in an area of comparabw 
economic equality, dealing with the familiar trans-
action of their everyday concerns, couched in the 
terse language of businessmen, intended to apply 
to an almost infinite variety of prospective and 
undetermined events, the contract should be read, 
not with the thought of measuring it by the p~e­
cision of legalistic niceties, but with an e~e slll-
gle to discerning the intentions of the parties. 
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''So viewed, it would seem that the descriptive 
phrase, 'in u:hatever manner the same may be 
rn used * * *' was intended expressly to eliminate 
the restrictive requirement of a proximate, causal 
connection between operation of the detouring 
train and damages and to apply the indemnity and 
exemption provisions to damages resulting which 
would not have occurred but for the fact of the 
detour, the existence of additional hazard imposed 
hy the very presence of a foreign train on the 
tracks in use, even though the loss and damage 
directly resulted from the negligence of the in-
demnitee 's own servants. Thus construed, it would 
seem that the clause, 'by reason of such trams 
l1eing detoured,' serves the function only of elimi-
nating from the indemnity provisions those losses 
and damages in which the detouring train had no 
part ,whatsoever." (italics added in part.) 
It will be noted the judge relied on nothing more 
nor less than the "but for" test to decide what type or 
nature of "ca use" or connection was appropriate to 
i1ffoke the indemnity there sought. We particularly ask 
the court to note the only reason for holding, as the court 
did in that case, that the presence of the foreign train 
was a cause of the loss was simply that the existence of 
the train imposed some additional hazard created by 
nothing more than its presence. We can already hear 
def end ant's counsel asserting the facts of that case were 
different. And in some ways they were. But as an 
analysis of the question of what businessmen, parties 
to an agreement, mean by such broad words as "cause", 
"due to", or "arising because of", the case cannot be 
distinguished from the case at bar. As said in that case, 
the language ''by reason of'' (which is scarcely different 
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Ill meaning to any ordinary p<•rso11 than "dn .. to" or 
"a rist>s lwea use of") sl'n·ps only t IH• fu11dio11 of Plim
1 
Hating from tlw iudt•mnity pnn-isious thosp losst·~ ;
1
, 
which the rfrtourin.Q train had 110 part whafel'l·r. Wr shalt 
be interested to ht1 ar this (h•fo11da11t 's counsel Pxplai 11 J1,, 11 
it can fairly hf' ~mid the existPnee of El Paso's pip£>li 11 .. 
and itt~ maintenane<> had "no part whate\·pr" i11 Sta<·t:>y·-
ac<'ident, wlwn that t'xistern·e a11d that mai11t1•11ttrn·r Wt>ri 
the sole reasons for his J>rt•s1·11ee 011 or mw of the ern!-.~in!l 
True, those sole n·asons for his Jirt>s<'JH't' tht•r1· did 1w 
rause the accideut in a11y fault or Pven "proxirn.att• 
cause" sc>nse. Rut thosp so)p rPasons for his prt>l'le111·11 
were a cam;(' of his accident in thP only se11sc> impflrtm1: 
here, i.e. as a matter of "eausp in fact"; and as ordinar: 
men considering- the relationship hc>twN1 n two sPparatt· 
events or phenomena speak nnd think of cause and pffort. 
In the case of Alumiuum Co. of A mrrini '"· ll111/11 
(1952), 200 F. (2d) 2;)7, the Eighth Circuit Court of ..:\p-
peals considered a cas<' in whirh an i11jun·d workman wa' 
not actually en~agt1d at tht> momt>nt of his injury in per-
formin~ the task i-;peeifieally <"OHred hy a <·011trn{'t witli 
an inde>muity Jffo,·ision. fostPad hC' l1ad stoppt•d w(lrk 
and gone to a plaep awa~· from his work sitt> for a rt>a~"11 
not rPally mat<>rial ht>r<'. Tl11· ('011rt said: 
"The situatio11 whi<·h th<' <·ontrad. in<'ludin!! 
the indemnity pr<n-ision, eo11t<'mplatt>d was. t~at 
Alroa would hP <'arrviug- on its opc>rations 111 1!~ 
Remelt Building a11°d tli<• <'Ontrador would lw 
sPnding- i11 mPn and materials a111l {'lllll'ing tht· 
work ~f tlw rontrnet to he do1w in tlw huildin~ 
eo11r1irrP11tly with Aleoa 's 01wratio11s thrn'. Also. 
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that it might he claimed and established to the sat-
i:-facti<111 of a jury that Alcoa's operations were 
11Pi.dig-P11t. The operations necessarilv entailed 
risk of injury to Pwryone in the building within 
t lu•i r n•ach. The indemnity of Article 24 is relat-
l'd to that risk. The plain intent and purport of 
1 he> words 'pPrsonal injuries of Pmployees of Con-
t rad or arisinJ.! out of or in any manner connect('d 
with tht' performance of this contract' read in 
tlwir C'ontPxt is that the Contractor would answer 
for i11juriPs to its employees whom the Contractor 
l'ansPd to he within reach of such hazards for the 
pnrposP of performing its contract, whether 
1·a usPd hy t lw negligence of Alcoa or otherwise. As 
thP eontract is not contrary to public policy, illegal 
or niid, awl is unamhiguom;;, the duty of the court 
is to apply it according- to the intention of the par-
t if's as <·xpress<'d in its terms. (citing cases) 
"Tlw stipulated facts establish that the right 
awl t lu' only right or rPason Barnes had to he in 
.\)('oa 's HPm<'lt Building in proximity to its op-
t>rations was to do his part in the performance of 
tlH· ('011tract. That is the purpose for which the 
1·1111t rad or Pmploye<l him tlwre. There was no 
abandonment of the purpose when Barnes moved 
to gPt out of the way of the dangerous gases 
1111t ii t hc-y should he dissipated. Such moving 
out of tlu•ir way was simply his response to a con-
dition of work at th<' place' whPrC' he was applying 
a:-hi·stos a11<l no more terminated his performance 
of tl11• <'nntraet than going for a drink of water 
or to answPr oth1:1r ealls of nature or to fetch need-
Pd tools or appliances or to obtain instructions 
or to do anY of th<' incidentals that distinguish 
tlw workin~ of a man from the working of a 
m:i<"liirn>. 
• • • 
'' "1wn the ordinary and usual significance is 
c-inn to the words us~d in Article ~4 and they 
are considered in relation to tlw cirl·umstanl·•·s rij' 
the contract and the oeeurr<'nr<' of thP i11j11rit•:-, and 
damage, it is plain that it was tlw intP11tion o;' 
the parties that th<' contractor should d(•l\·nd atid 
iwlc>mnify Aleoa against th<' dPma111b mad .. Ji, 
Banws for tht> injuriPs IH• snfff'r<'d in <·01111Pdiiq, 
with his 1wrformam•p of th<• <·ontraet. Though 
the sprc>adin.i: of the> gasl's <·n•afl•d an .-nwrg1·JH·r 
that dron• him off his s<'affold tPmporari!Y aa;l 
onto th<' traek of thP tran•ling <-ran<·. h" ·11e1w 
cease<l to he an im·itP1' of ~\ lcoa who c·anw into it' 
factory building and at all timt>s up to thr injun 
remained tht>r<> to 1wrform t hp eo11t met. His fligl;t 
from the gases was an ineid<'nt of thl' job ari~ing 
out of it and <'Olllll'rtl'd with it. A1Hl so \IHt· 
the injuries he suff Pred in tlw flight and thr d1•-
ma11d for damages he> assPrtPd 011 a<"eonnt ot' 
the injuri<>s. To consid<>r Barn<>s 's adi,·ity till!~ 
at th<' moment of the injury is coutrary to tlH" 
broad and eomprehensin• t<>rms of tla• agret•mPHt 
that injuriPs arising- out of or in any mam1er 
conneeted with performanr<' Wl'fl' indt•mnifi1>d 
against.'' 
Can it he> douhtl•d tlwt ~ta<·(•y's HSl' of th1· 1·ro~~i11::. 
the only practieal routP to the 1H<'H of till• pipt>lin1• wiH'l'l' 
he was going to work, was intimat<'ly <·on11P<·t1•d with 
maintenanee of the pipPli1w ! Is tlH'l'l' any ho11l'st diffrr-
ence between sayi11g X will irnlPmnit\ Y against any 1 1 1~~ 
"c.onnectPd with" somp 1iroj1•d awl saying- X will in-
demnify ag-ainst a11y lol's "howso1•n•r c·aust>d. i11 a11 1 
wav due to or arising lw<"Hlll'P of" tht> c>xist(•Jlt'l' nf a 
pipeline! To att«>mpt fq dis<'on·r a distindio11 ig-11orP~ 
not only C'ommon sc·ns(• 111 t•\·1·ryda~· affair~ hut abn 
the meaning- whi<'h ordinary JH•oph• int«>rnl to eo11\·p~· li~­
plain awl wPll m11lt>rstood English words. 
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\\'P 1wxt ask the eourt to ('Onsid('r what has come to 
lw o11P of thP l1·adi11g and most ('ited eases on the subject 
1if' i 11d1•m11ity 1·011trads, Co<'<'.11 '" l'irpi11iau Ry. Co. (1936) 
s.-J F. ( ~d) !li'(i. This case is l'speeially illuminating, we 
tliillk. hP<'<lUs1• tlu.·n· is a disse11ting opi11ion espousing and 
i·xpn1111di11i: th1• C'Xa('t position defe11dant takes in the 
<·n,.1· at liar and which .Judge EIIC'tt ackaneed in oral dis-
t·us:-ion int h1· trial ('Ourt. 111 tlw Co('('y ease, the plaintiff 
railroad had grantl•d the defendants the right to occupy 
railroad propert~· with a stile. A stranger to both plain-
tiff a11d dt>frnda11ts usPd tht> stilC' and was strurk by one 
nf plai11tiff 's trains. The dC'fondants had agreed to in-
.J,·muit\ tht> plaintiff against losses arising "hy reason or 
i~i <'"''"'''lll"IH'<' of tlu.· oeeu1nn1<·y or the use of the said 
11rPmi"l'". 11r tli.· usp of tlw pro1)('rty of tlw Railway Com-
pau~· ad.ia('t>lll thPrl'to." Onp who hC'ard .Judge Ellett 's 
n·nwrb i11 till· c·ast' Ht bar (•ould 11ot hut have been im-
J'l'•'"s1·d that hi' was h<'arimr an c>('ho of .Judge Parker's 
.Ji,.s.-11t: for .JwkP Parker said: 
"OklPy StikP was injnr<'d while crossing the 
railway tra('ks at this crossin.g, as a result of the 
llP! . .di!!PIH'<' of tlH• railway company in the opera-
tio11 of OJH• of its trains, and recm·ered a ,·erdict 
a11d jud!.,'1ll<>llt i11 tlw sum of $10,000 on aceount 
of this 111'~.dig<'ll<'t': hut tlu.• rlaim upon whirh the 
n·nlid a11d jud~'1TIC'llt W<'re ohtai1wd was clearly 
not 011P a rising 'hy rt>ason or in rom1equenee of 
tlit• o<·c·upmu·y or tlw usp' of thC' st<'ps, or of the 
<To-;si11g to 'd1i<'h thPy ll•d hut one arising 'hy r<'a-
"011 alld i11 1·011s<•q11C'11<'<' of' the negligence of the 
raihrn~· <·ompany i11 th<' opPration of its train. 
\\-l11•rt> 0111• prop('rly using a crossing- is injured 
as a rl'sult of such 11<>,glig<'n<:>C', it is not the use of 
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till' rrossmg hut thP 11Pglig-e11<·(• whi<'l1 <·au:-t>s thi· 
i11jury: and thP claim tl1t·n·upo11 arisi11!! (·11111101 
properly ))(' said to ari:-P 'by n·aso11 or in 1·01 1 ~ 1 • 
qtH'llre' of tlH• USP of th1· <·rossi11g, for thf'sp t(lrm, 
import a <'ausal n•lationship. The use of tlu• rr11~,;­
ing no mon' establishes !'ll<'h C'ausal relatio11ship. 
e\·en though th<.' injury would not han• O<'<'Uffr·d 
but for such use, than the usl• of a strPPt 1·ould i., 
said to be thP rause of an injury (':lllsPd hy a fall-
ing sign, merPly lw('alls(• t ht> perso11 injur1'd w11uld 
not ha\"e bee11 st ru('k hy thl• sig11 if he had 11111 
been using th<' stl'<'Pt. ThP distinrtio11 het\\E'f'Jt 
the ram~e of an injury and a ffil'rl' rowlition with-
out whieh it would not han• orrnrrPd is wPI! ft>•·-
oguiw<l i11 thP law. ( ('iting <·as<'s) And a rontra1 .. 
i11demnifyi11g against rlaims arisi11g by rPason or 
in ('Ollsequenre of the usP of property ought 11n; 
be construed to rO\·er a rasp wlu•n• ti\(' \l!-'1• of tlw 
property was not the raust> of the arisiuir of th•· 
rlaim but merely furnished a situatio11 in whiel1 
the negligence of another gan risP to th<.' elaim. If 
it had hN•11 intPrnlPd to irnl<>m11ify against lia-
bility for C'laimi.; arising out of injuries rn·cnrri11C' 
at the crossing, tlwr<> would han' hPt•11 110 tr1111hl1• 
i11 so prO\·iding hy appropriatt• la 11guag1'.'' 
Indeed, tlw rest of JudgP ParkPr's c·omm<'11ts arP i11 tlw 
same vein. The spPcial signifieRJH'l' of this c·asl' is found 
in the fact that the> very g-ist of El Paso 'i.; eoutl'lltio11, 
forc('fully stated and lueidly l'Xplairn•d, was rPj<'dt•d out-
right hy tlw majorit~· opinion of thl' ('ourt. ~\nd tht> mi· 
sons for rejwting su<'h a narrow vit>\\. of what partil'~ !•' 
a c.ontract mean by words su<'h as '• hy rpaso11 or i11 ro1 1-
sequence of" (surely not in eommo11 usa~1· materially 
different in meauin~ than "due to or arises hPC·ause of"I 
arc> almost a restat<>mPnt of the reaso11s for rnion Pa· 
L·itk's positio11 111 the ease at har. In the CMey ease, the 
majority opinion of the court said: 
·'It i:-; eon!Pnded 011 behalf of the defendants 
that th£> )past• agTPemt·nt did not indemnifv the 
railway cornpaHy for injuries oe<'urring ;n its 
tra<'ks alld <·ausPd solely hy thP negligence of the 
railwa~· employees, and that £>nn if intended to 
indf'mnif~· against c-laims for injuries to certain 
<·las..;Ps of 1wrso!ls the irnlPmnity did not extend 
to tlw Stih claim. 
"\rht>11 we n•a<l thl' imlemnity elause and gin 
to the words ust:>d the iutPrpretation demanded hy 
th('ir plain, ordinary meaning, we are forced to 
t IH• c·onclu..;ion that the first contention on behalf 
of tlw d<·fondantR is not sound. The language used 
is broad, comprelwrno1ive and without ambiguity. 
If t lu• words us('(} did not mean to indemnify 
a!!ainst <'laims of the chararter of the Stike claim, 
tliPll tlH·~· nwant nothing-. There was no other 
<·lnss of c·laims that rould he brought against the 
railwa~· <'ompm1y against which to indemnify. 
"This interpretation of the indemnity clause is 
1·mphasizPd when we look at the eireumstanees 
surrounding the exPcution of tlw lease. 
" ·To as<'ertain thC' intent of the parties is the 
fu11dam<·11tal rulC' in thP construction of agree-
nH·11 ts ( C'i t iug c·ases) ; and in such eonstruetion 
<·ourt:-; look to tht> language employed, the subject-
matt<•r, a11d tlw surrounding eircumstanees. They 
arP JH•\·pr :-;hut out from the' same li1{ht which the 
partiP:-; <·1ijoyC'd wl1rn the contrad was executed, 
and in that ,·iew thC'Y are rntitled to place them-
"Plns i11 tlu• same .situation which the parties 
who made tl11• <'Ollt ract oc<·upied, so as to view the 
,·in·umstaiH·P:-; as they ,·iewed them, and so to 
jud!!P of tl1P nwaniug- of words awl of the eorre<'t 
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appliration of tlw lang-uag-e to the things dP-
srrilwd.' ( eiting- eases) 
"I . . I I 11 Pllt<>rmg- mto t 1e t>asP rontraet tlw railwa, 
company was aeting- in a pri,·atP eharadl·r a~ ~ 
property ow1wr and f'ntirrly outsidr thP seopp ot' 
a eommon earri<>r. Tl!(' lt>aSl' was Pntt>n•d into for 
a nominal eonsidPratio11 ($1) and soil•ly for tlw 
h<>nefit of tll(' dl'fondants. Tbf' maintl'11ancP of tlw 
steps rould not possibly hl• of thl' slig-htrst hPTH'-
fit to the railway c·ompany in any capacity, and ii: 
no way aich•d it in its husi11ess, and the compa11y 
would evidently not haYe ronsf'ntPd to incur th1· 
additional risk of aeeidents from the existrnel• of 
tlw right of way for praetieally no rPntal. un]e,, 
it were i11demnified in some way. 
"It has been repeat<>dly lwld that a railw;,: 
company not acting a::-; a eommon earrier may l'X· 
empt itself, hy eontraet, from liability for 11eg-li-
gence. (citing cases) 
"The loeation and usP of thl' skps and thl' ad-
jarent railroad trarks add(•d g-rPatly to tlw hazard 
of injury h~- passing trains .• \11 Pxami11atio11 of 
tlw decision of till• \\'(•st Yirgi11ia ( 'onrt in tlw 
RtikP ( 'ase, supra, shows that t Ill• railwa~· v:a· 
held liahlP for thl• in.inr~- to ~tikP hl'l'ansP tlH· pn·-· 
c>ll<'<' of the stt>ps ro11sP11ted to hy thl• railway ('(>ID· 
pa11y eonstitnh•d au ill\·itntiou to tlw public to 
cross the traek at that point and cast n;Hm thl' 
railway eomnanv nil tl1t• d11ties rn•cessary to a 
• I • , 
puhlie erossiug-. (A /H«l'i .... ·dy "fJ11ira/p11f l"lfll 
ff(lS QSS<'rft'f/ !J.1/ ,'-,'fll<"l'.l/ i11 Jiis s11if ll,flai11sf f'. [:.) 
Tlw <'Ourt held that th<' injur<'d hoy was au Ill· 
,·itre awl not a li('PJISl'<'. Rut for thP skps thl'fl' 
wonl1l han• het>11 110 liability allll c·o11sl'•Pll'llt lo·~ 
to the plaintiff. Ag-aiust any loss of this eha~art('~ 
th<' dPfendants c·nntrad<•d to hold the railwa) 
rom pan~· ha rrnlt•ss. Tlw eo11sPq 11P11ces may hP 
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harsh, hut C'011trads that are plain must he en-
fon·l•tl. 
''The dt><'isions relit>ll upon on he half of the 
d(•frnda11ts 1lPal with irHlc·mnity elarn;;es contained 
in 1·ontnH'ts from whiC'h th<' indemniti<'s derived 
som1• lwrn•fit, Pither dir<>d or indirert, and thev 
an• not C'Olltrolli11g h{'re. · 
'' Tht> eontC'11tion that 8tik{• did not com<> with-
in t lw <'lass of persons eover{'d hy the indemnity 
1·la11sP is 11ot sound. The language of the clause, 
·or to ot IH•r p<'rsons,' is general and all inclusive . 
. \ t t ht> t im<' of th<' <'X<'(•ntion of the lease by C'acey 
& II nght-s, tl1{' erossing over the railroad trarks, 
down thl' stPps, was inns<' hy the puhlir generally, 
and t !1 is faC't was known to the defendants." 
\\'1• think it would <'\·idC'nee grave <lisrespert for this 
(·ourt 's ('a pa<' it i1·s to prolong this hrief hy ext<:>nsive qu0-
tati11n.; from othPr cases. ''l' are therefore content to 
('itt> without disC'ussion ct-rtain additional derisions deal-
in:.r with th(• hasie pri11eip!Ps eontrolling th<:> point under 
<·011sitkratio11. .\i-; to those eas<'s W<' conrede the facts 
art> not idt>ntieal, hnt we add these cases are not inserted 
h"n· as window dn•ssing. Eaeh is, we think, genuinely 
ill1:strntin of tlu• l<'gal doctrine that in ronstruing an 
i11d.,m11ity a!.~Tl'{'ffic•11t sueh as is here presented, it is ha-
sil'ally a11d fo11dam(•11tally wrong and improper to ron-
.-1rn1· words or phras(•s su<'h as ''dne to", "arises he-
1·a1isp of", ··in l'Olllll'dio11 "·ith ", and the likt>, in terms 
of "proxima tl· ea use": arnl it is fundamentally right 
anll ('OJ'J't>d to c·onstnw such words or phrases broadly 
to effl'c·tuatp thP intc·11tio11s of layme11, who were not at 
all ('Oll<'Pfll<'d with lPga l nieC"t ies i1ffoking distinrtions 
between "proximate causes" and "eonditiorn~" hut witli 
the financial realities of risks and hazards of lu.~ ...... In that 
spirit we ask this rourt to consider the following: 
Ryan Mercantile Co. v. Great Northern RaiJwar1 
Co., 294 F. (2d) 629. This case' is, on it's 
facts, almost identiC'al to the case at bar. 
Seaboard Air Lin.e R. f'o. v. Rirh mond-Pf'fn~burlJ 
Turnpike Authority, (Va.) 121 8.E. (2d) 499. 
Please note in this case the court said that if 
the parties intended to impose indemnity lia-
bility for all damage which could he re.late<l 
to the existence of the hri<lge involn>d, they 
could have said so. In the cas(l at bar th.e 
parties did say so. 
Priu('emont C'onstrudion Corporation v. B. &: 0. 
RR Co., (D. C.) 131 A. (2d) 877; 
JJT estern Pnion TPl. Co. v. Fitchburg Gas & Eln-
tric Co., (Mass.) 137 :K.E. (2d) 459; 
Northern Par. Ry. f'o. , .. Thornton Bros. fu .. 
(Minn.) 288 N.W. 226; 
Go1_:ero L Sta11dard Oil Co., 192 F. (2d) 962: 
National Transit f'o. r. Daris, 6 F. (2d) 729: 
Mutual Employpes Trademart v. A rmnur Serrin' 
of Florida (Fla.) 170 Ro. (2<1) 64; 
Citl/ of C!Prelan.d, Ohio v. B. & 0. R. C'o., 71 F. 
(2d) 89. 
An additional comment on this phase of th(l ras(' 
seems ne<'.essary. "" e had not supposed there was auy 
real douht that one on duty for El Paso in the rour~t> 
of his employm<'nt, direetly en routP to perform maiuh'-
nanc.e work for El Paso, via the only practiral route 
available to him or to El Pa~o, was for all intrnts and 
1 
1, 
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purposc·s l'Bg-aged in doing maintenance work for El 
Paso. ( \•rtaiuly in the context of workmen's compen-
~atiou Jaws forneh an t>mployee is (>ngaged in an activity 
~uffi<'il'Ilt to he considered'' arising out of or in the course 
of liis Pmployment" in even less persuasive circum-
~taiH·t)s. Please see Cudahy Pa~king Co. , .. Industrial 
('111111nissi1111, (iO l~tah 161, 207 Par. 148; and Cu.dahy 
f'a1k111.q ('u. , .. Parramotf', 263 l".S. 418; 44 Sup. Ct. 
1~>:{; 68 L. J<:d. ::lGG. It is really impossible for us to 
"L'" a11y logical reason why a person situated as was 
Parrnmore should he ronsidered as ha\'ing been killed 
[11 :lll adiYity arising out of or in the course of his 
1•mplo~·ment hut that Stacey, in substantially similar 
1·ir('nmsh1nc·Ps, should not he ronsidered as injured 
dnr to }wing engaged in his job of "maintaining" 
tliP piJ>f·linl·. But if there is some distinction, though we 
must say it eseapes us, then it should he remembered that 
in its 1·omplaint in this ease plaintiff alleged Stacey was 
:1ot only 1'11 route to do maintenance work but also that 
Iii> ,,·as adnally t>ng-aged in performing- surh work at the 
timt> of his injury. Plaintiff relies in support of this 
latt(·r allP!!ation upon defendant's admission that Stac.ey 
\\'a" not only en ronte to do work after he reached the 
pipPli1)(_• hut also that lw was, at the Yery moment of his 
injury, leading or guiding two other men, who were en-
!!'H!!Pd h~· this df'i'Pndant to do maintenanee work on the 
pipeline, to the pr('eise spot where they were to do that 
1rork. Ple>ast> st>e 11Pfernla11t 's response to plaintiff's Re-
1/lll'~t for .\1lmission Xo. 1 (R. 60). }<~yen if Stacey's con-
il1H·t in going to thP pipeli11e himself was not "main-
taining-" th .. pipt•line until hr aetually got there, what is 
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to he said of his act in making tlw trip to show tlw pre-
cise 8ite of proposed maintPnanee work to otlu·r maiutl'-
nanee men r If his aet for that purposp is not part and 
parcel of "maiutaining" the pipeli1w, in any and ewn 
practical or real sP!lS(', tlwn what is it~ lueidt•11tally it 
c-0uld and would ht> pron•d hy plaintiff, if nPe(•ssary, that 
Stacey and tlw two m('ll hl' was guiding to t hP sitP were 
also actively transporting pow<'r ma<"hi11Pry or equip-
ment to that 8itc>, tlwrp to lw usl'd in maintaining- th1• pip1·-
line, at tlw v<>ry mom<>nt of StaePy 's injury. 
There i8 anotlwr factor m this lawsuit whi('lt !ta> 
some hearing on the natun' of thP eom1t•dio11 or rela-
tionship hetwePn what St1H'('Y was <loi11.!! whf>ll he wa.' 
injured and tlw existellC(' or nsP or maintc·11am·c· of the 
pipeline. Th<' partiPs to thP dP('(l cont<'mplat<'<i that El 
Paso's employees had to J"('H<'h the PH8l'ffi<'llt areas ror-
ered hy thP descriptions in tht> dPPd in sonw way. Thi~ i• 
demonstrated hy th<> <'Xpress wording of tli<' 1l1·Pd it~Plf 
which not 011ly convp~·pd t hP PHSt>ffiPllt i11tt>r<'sts dt>s('ril11•d 
hut also mPntimwd "the• rig']1t of i:1grpss arnl P!!rPss to. 
from a11d upon said strips of Jarnl. '' f II Yi!'W of thi~ it 
c-an srarcPly lw gairnrnid that thf> partit>s to t hi" dPPd ('IH1· 
sid<>red, a8 hehn•<>n thc•msPh'C's, that El Paso's adiYiti1·' 
in going to or from tlw prospl•c·tin• pipPlinP to hnild i: 
and to mai11tain it W('J'<' intimntPly <·011llP<'kd witl1. r·~Sl'll· 
tial to, and part of th0 ultimntP tnsks of huilding-. u:o:irnr 
and maintaining- that pipPli11<'. 'YhPtlH•r or not Starey 
waA using som.-• right of i11grpss or <>gn•ss the· (}P!'d hail 
g-rant0d El Pa8o, nPvPrtht>IPss hP wns t>llgngt>d in an M'· 
tiYity which tlw partiPs had ckfi11it<>l~· re<'og-nize<l as a 
,·ital part "f maintaining the pipeline - to wit, getting 
to it. 
\lor<>O\'Pr, it seems particularly appropriate to im-
pose liability on this dPfendant since Stacey was actually 
exprcising some right of ingress co1ffeyed hy the deed at 
thP m"m1•11t of his aecident. Please see the Ryan case 
eitl'd snpra at page 32. Plaintiff eontends Stacey was 
f'Xl'ITisi11.ir sn<'h a right for two reasons. (a) The gen-
1•ral 111g-n·ss awl e>gress provision of thf> instrument was 
11ot !!1•og-raphif'ally limitf>d in any way by other language 
r,f tlw d1·1·d. Tlw only practical way for El Paso's men 
to rf'~wh the an•a wherf:> Stacey was going is via the cross-
i11!! wlinP 111· was injun•d and a bridge over a river lo-
1·att·d lwtwt•t>n plaintiff's tracks and defendant's pipeline 
tlwn.. .\ dirt road known to Staeey actually existed on 
thP 1·artli o\·pr that route>. ~o other practical route exist-
f'd fnr usi11g that road to the arf>a Stacey was bound for 
"xe1·pt <l\'Pr thP <'rossing, so that if El Paso did not use 
tl11· prirntl' railroad crossing in question and the private 
hrid!!f' mP11tio11Pd, t ht> ingress and egress provision of 
1111· dP<'d was meaningless, as applied to the area of the 
pip1·li111· in qtwstion. Please see RNdaf<'mn1t of Property, 
\'olnm1• ;-), S1·c·tio11 482, partieularly the comment to 
('Ian"" ( C'). El Paso had often used the crossing where 
Sta1·py was injurP<l. Plaintiff had not prevented such 
ll"'f'. ( R. 44, 4."), Hi4.) This suggests strong!~- the practi-
('al C"onstruetion plaeed hy the parties to the deed on the 
llil'HJ1in!! of thP ingrt>ss and egTess provision thereof was 
that it i1wlndPd somP ri~d1t to use of the erossing. Exactly 
what 11amp a n•al property lawyPr would gfre that right 
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is not important. Restatement of Property, Volume 5 
' Section 483, and particularly the comment to Clause (d) 
thereof. (b) But of even greater significance, the deed 
from Union Pacific almost surely carried with it to El 
Paso some right to cross plaintiff's tracks at the crossino· 
~ 
in question by implication under well established prin-
ciples of law, 'vhether or not Union Pacific subjectiveh 
so intended and whether or not the ingress and egress 
language of the deed was itself legally sufficient to ac-
complish that result. Please see the Restatement of 
Property, Volume 5, Section 47 4; the comment to Clause 
(b) of Section 475, which points out that a conveyance of 
a particular easement interest may by implication and 
as incidental thereto create another easement interest of 
whatever sort is necessary to reach the easement area 
specifically conveyed; Section 476, together with all com-
ment and illustrations included therewith and partic11-
larly Comment (g) thereof. And whether El Paso 
acquired some right to use the crossing by virtne of (a) 
the ingress and egress provision of the deed or (b) l1!t 
implication, the extent of that right was subject to nor-
mal development of the use of the pipelinr itself. Rl'-
staf ernent of Property, Volume 5, Section 484, and par-
ticularly Comment (b). Will this defendant nm,- say 
Stacey's use of this crossing at the time of his accident 
was not a "normal development" of that use~ 
Of course, vVyoming Ia-w would he controlling on 
the nature of whatever right El Paso had to use the pri-
vate railroad crossing where Stacey was injured. But wr 
can find no vVyoming statutes or cases which apprar sig-
nificant in this respect. In such circumstances the doc-
trines of the Restatement become particularly persuasive. 
It may he added this court has accepted at least some of 
the Restatement views cited above. Please see Adamson 
':. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. (2d) 264; Wood v. Ash-
by, 122 Utah 580, 253 P. (2d) 351. We mention all of the 
foregoing matters first, as we have said, because it is 
appropriate to impose liability upon this defendant since 
El Paso was using some right which actually grew out of 
the deed when Stacey used the crossing where he was 
hurt. But secondly, we also think these matters have real 
significance in determining what the parties meant and 
should he held to have meant by the words ''due to or 
arises be ca use of" used in the indemnity provision of 
the deed. If the parties to that instrument in fact con-
templated use by El Paso of the private railroad cross-
ing, or e\·en if it is true that principles of law require it 
to be assumed those parties considered that possibility 
so that l1nion Pacific in fact granted a right to use the 
(Tossing despite the fact neither party ever actually 
thought of the matter at all, is it not altogether reason-
alile to eonclude the parties intended to eo,·er indemnity 
for losses arising from use of the crossing by El Paso 
for its own purposes when they used the broad language, 
''due to or arises because of", in the indemnity provi-
sion of the deed? For if the purpose of the indemnity 
pnn·ision of the deed was to protect Union Pacific against 
all risk of Joss arising ewn from the e:ristente of the 
pipeline, and such purpose is transparent from the lan-
g-nage used and the whole situation here, then the hazards 
of use of the crossing "·erc> an inseparable part of the 
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total increased risks which the existence of the pipeline 
created. 
In summarizing this point of this brief, we ask the 
court to take into account the following fundamental 
considerations : 
1. The real issue to be decided here require8 deter-
mination of what the parties to the deed meant by thP 
words used. 
2. Those parties were and are practical and actiYe 
business corporations, not theorists in some fairyland. 
The plaintiff operates a railroad; the defendant operate~ 
major pipelines. The representatives of those partie~ 
who negotiated and consummated the transaetion culmi-
nating in the deed here involved were not interested at 
all in legal philosophies. They knew that a major pipe-
line to be constructed alongside or close to a railroad 
track over miles of distance would inescapabl~- create 
new risks and hazards of loss and injury; that the exact 
methods or ways in which such losses or injuries might 
occur ·were infinite in number and in Yariety; aud that 
neither they nor anyone else could foresee all the pos-
sible ways those losses could or would occur. But one 
such risk which mn8t have occurred to them wa8 the hn-
ard created when people connected in some direct \rn.r 
with the construction or the maintenance or e\·en thr 
existence of the pipeline came ph~·sicall~- near or onto 
the railroad company's tracks. Any drnia1 of that state-
ment charges those men with blinding themseln•s to ex-
perience. 
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3. The representatives of the parties to this deed 
were not concerned "''ith and did not care about such 
legal problems as are inherent in the doctrine of "proxi-
mate cause." Indeed, if they had bothered to study that 
subject at all they would have learned, as every lawyer 
knows, that issues of proximate cause are in nearly all 
cases submitted to the vagaries of decision by juries 
after loss or damage has already occurred. These par-
ties did not choose to rely on what a jury might decide 
about any such question of proximate cause when it 
came to placing the cost of an accomplished loss as be-
tween themselves. 
4. The parties framed the indemnity liability El 
Paso was agreeing to accept in the very broadest of 
terms, using phrases and words such as ''any and all 
linhilit:·", of whatsoever nature", "harm to persons 
whomsoe,·er", "damage, howsoever caused", "or in any 
other \Yay whatsoever", and "is due to or arises hecause 
of.'~ They then catalogued and listed every noun de-
scriptive of any activity of El Paso which might there-
after occur with reference to the pipeline, adding e\·en 
the "existence" of the same. Broader description of 
the general gamut of the newly born hazards which El 
Paso was to accept the risk and duty of paying for is 
difficult to conceive. 
5. The parties expressed their intent hy means 
neither obscure nor uncertain. 
miliar words were employed. 
No deceptive or unfa-
And those words these 
parties used should now be construed to accomplish what 
they intended; not what a lawyer or even a judge now 
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thinks the parties ought or should have intended. To 
construe this indemnity provision in violation uf its ·word-
ing so as to allow El Paso to escape the indemnitv lia-
bility it agreed to assume is to reject the right of two 
major corporations, who knew exactly what they were 
doing, to agree between themselves how losses sure to 
occur in the years ahead should be dea1t with. 
POINT II 
THE INDEMNITY LANGUAGE USED 
HERE APPLIES TO A LOSS SUSTAINED 
BY PLAINTIFF EVEN IF THAT LOSS WAS 
PROXIMATELY CAUSED, IN PART, BY 
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE. 
The clef endant asserts the indemnity language here 
under consideration was not intended to apply and does 
not apply to eover any loss from any accident proximately 
caused, even in part, by this plaintiff's o-wn negligence. 
In so contending, defendant is asking this court to return 
to the days of the 18th Century when form in a legal in-
strument or pleading was everything and substance 
counted for nothing. But those days are golle without 
lament. True, the indemnity provision of the deed dM~ 
not use the vrnrcl "negligence." But seyeral of the cases 
we have cited above have thoroughly discussed wording 
of other instruments having the same claimed deficienc». 
and have rejected defendant's contention. And on this 
particular point, plaintiff need not rely exclusiYely on 
decisions from jurisdictions other than \V;'oming deal-
ing with the question. The answer to the defendant'~ 
contention has been furnished hy a "\Vyoming federal 
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judge, applying -Wyoming law, to a -Wyoming case; and 
if the law of --Wyoming in that respect is ascertainable, 
surely it governs the case at bar. In C. & N. TV. Ry. Co. 
v. Rissler (1960), 184 F. Supp. 98, the defendant there 
eontended, as does the defendant here, that an indemnity 
agreement does not cover a loss caused by the indemni-
tee 's negligence unless its language, in haec verba, pro-
vides that indemnity is recoverable even though the in-
demnitee was guilty of negligence causing the loss. In 
rejecting that contention the Wyoming federal court, 
<1uoting from another decision, said: 
"It seems clear that it is not necessary that the 
parties make use of the word 'negligence' in a pro-
vision in order to make the provision applicable 
to a party's own negligence and that it is sufficient 
if the parties by 'apt language' include such neg-
ligence.'' 
In the case at bar the indemnity provision of the deed 
specifically says that it shall cover "all liability, loss, 
etc." ... when such loss "howsoever caused" is due to or 
arises because of even the existence of the pipeline. It 
defies common sense and glorifies form instead of sub-
~tance to say that this broad language does not cover a 
loss merely because negligence of the railroad company 
may also have been a cause thereof. Does not ''all'' 
still mean ''all''? At least as to injuries sustained by 
third persons (certainly such injuries are included in 
the term used in the deed: ''injury ... of persons whom-
soe cer") Union Pacific would not even be initially liable 
to sueh third person unless the railroad company was it-
self negligent. Therefore, to read the indemnity Ian-
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guage of the deed here as applicable only when no neg-
ligence of the railroad company contributed to whatever 
loss has been sustained by such third person is to say 
the parties to this deed engaged in idle chatter when 
they expressly said that the indemnity provided should 
cover ''all losses'' sustained by ''persons whomsoever.'' 
Nor can the provision in the deed for indemnity for losses 
"howsoever caused" be interpreted reasonably to ex-
clude losses caused in whole or in part by negligence of 
the railroad company. ''Howsoever caused'' still means 
"howsoever ca used" does it not? Accordingly, this de-
fendant's contention that the parties to this deed nHer 
intended to provide for indemnit:· coYerage on losses 
caused by Union Pacific's negligence asks this court to 
strike from the deed the words quoted above; or, in the 
alternative, to ignore them. 
This court has not taken a different view. In Barrus 
v. lVilkinson, ____ U. (2d) ____ , 398 P. (2d) 207, decided by 
this court in January, 1965, this court recognized that 
what is important on a question of this sort is whether or 
not the intention to cover losses caused hY an indemni-
tee 's own negligence is clearly and unequi,·ocally ex-
pressed. But no magic word or precise ''formula'' wa~ 
said by this court to be necessary. And the intent for El 
Paso to indemnify U. P. for "all losses" ... "howso-
ever caused" (surely including losses caused in part li:-
U. P. negligence) is clearly and unequivocally set forth 
in the deed at hand here. 
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Modern decisions from many other courts are in 
accord. Plea8e see Stern v. Larocca, (N.J.) 140 A. (2d) 
403, where the court said at page 407: 
"B~ the overwhelming weight of authority, 
8omethmg less than an express reference in the 
contract to losses from the indemnitee 's negli-
gence as indemnifiable will suffice to make them 
so if the intent otherwise sufficiently appears from 
language and circumstances.'' 
And please see also Rice v. Pennsylvania R. Com-
pany, 202 F. (2d) 861; J. V. McNicholas Transfer Com-
pany v. Pennsylrania R. Company, 154 F. (2d) 265; Jack-
son'l'ille Term. Company v. REA, Inc., 296 F. (2d) 256; 
Princemont Construction Corp. v. B. & 0. R.R. Company, 
(D. C.) 131 A. (2d) 877, already cited, supra; Alamo 
Lumber Company v. 1Varren Pet. Corp., 316 F. (2d) 287. 
POINT III 
THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT IN-
VOLVED HERE IS VALID AND IS NOT 
VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS 
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 
Defendant asserted in its ~lotion that the indemnity 
provision before this court is ''void and unenforceable 
as against public policy.'' This contention is absolute 
and utter nonsense, deserving of no extended response. 
For Wyoming, Judge Kerr answered defendant's 
public policy argument in the Rissler case, cited above, 
with his remarks at page 101 of 184 F. Supp. So many 
other courts have given the same ans\\·er to that argu-
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ment in reeent years it is almost beyond belief that able 
counsel for defendant included this point in their Motion 
for Summary Judgment. A few of the many cases re-
jecting defendant's eontention in this regard are as 
follows: 
Minneapolis-Moline Company v. Chicago, M., St. 
Paul and P. Ry. Company, 199 F. (2d) 725 at 
page 729, and as Point 2 in that opinion; 
Indemnity Insurarnce Company of North America 
v. Koontz-Wagner Electric Company, 233 F. 
(2d) 380 at page 383; 
Northern Pacific Ry. Company v. Thornton Bros. 
Co., ( 1\Iinn.) 288 N."T· 226 at page 228; 
Pettit Grain & Potato Company v. Northern Pa-
cific Ry. Company. (Minn.) 35 N.W. (2d) 12i 
at pages 132 and 133 as Points (11) and (12) 
of that opinion; 
James Stewart & Company v. Mobley, (Tex.) 282 
S.W. (2d) 290 at page 293 as Point 1 of that 
op1mon. 
Prolonged discussion of this particular suhject or 
citation of additional authorities seems unnecessary at 
this point. The plain fact is this clef endant has llPYer 
even alleged, much less attempted to establish how it 
eould in fact be true, that plaintiff was acting as a com-
mon carrier or in the exereise of any legal dut;- a:;: <I 
common carrier when it made and delivered tlie deed i11 
question to the defendant, merely because it often does 
act as a common carrier. Obviously, the real reasoll for 
the defendant's failure in these respects is that the plain-
tiff was not so acting as a common carrier in giYin~t th€ 
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Jeed. It was simply acting as the proprietor of land. 
1Iodern courts, appreciative of what has been and is now 
happening to tort liability law in today's cases, are 
simply refusing to hold that it is against public policy 
for a person or corporation to protect himself or itself 
against his own or its own conduct, negligent or other-
wise, by liability insurance or by indemnity agreements, 
unless very special conditions not existing here justify 
a <.lifferent ruling. 
POINT IV 
THERE vVAS CONSIDERATION FOR THE 
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT. 
Defendant's suggestion, stated m its Answer and 
repeated in its Motion for Summary Judgment, that there 
was no consideration for whatever indemnity liability de-
fendant assumed by accepting the deed is the most feeble 
of all the defendant's contentions. By its request for 
admission N" o. 4, plaintiff asked def end ant to admit in 
this case: 
"That in return for said deed, Exhibit 'A,' 
and in return for whatever contractual obliga-
tions were thereby assumed by defendant and its 
predecessor in interest under the indemnity pro-
visions of said Exhibit 'A,' said defendant and its 
predecessor in interest received from plaintiff 
some consideration having a substantial tangible 
value consisting of easements for said pipeline 
over the several strips of real property described 
in said Exhibit 'A,' together with at least some 
right of ingress and egress to and from said strips 
of real property over other lands of the plaintiff.'' 
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Defendant answered that request under oath as fol-
lows : ''Admitted.'' In view of this admission, we do not 
propose to dignify this point with further argument. 
CONCLUSION 
In candor we now acknowledge defendant's counsel 
can and probably will cite to this court some decisions 
which are, at least on cursory examination, contrary to 
plaintiff's position herein. Some of those decision8 \rill 
be old. Any modern cases of that sort are, we respect-
fully submit, the vestigial remains of an ancient judicial 
hostility to enforcement of indemnity agreements. That 
hostility was conceived and nurtured to maturity in a clay 
when tort liability law was a far different thing than it 
is today. Every judge and lawyer who deals \Yith neg-
ligence and liability law today knows, whether he ad-
mits it aloud or not, that the negligence or fault concepts 
of even twenty-five years ago are scarcely recognizable 
against the same concepts as applie(l toda:·. \Yhether one 
agrees or disagrees with that trend, ne\·ertheless it i8 true 
our law tends more and more to what is sometimes spoh11 
of as "enterprise liability." And that is due to ·what 
Professors Harper and James refer to as principles of 
''Social Insurance'' II Harper & James, The Law of Torts. 
Chapter XIII, particularly page 784. Hostilit>- in onr 
courts to enforcement of indemnity agreements at a timr 
when negligence liability was only imposed for nry real 
"fault" was one thing. Such hostility today when lia-
bility is often imposed for far different and less blame-
worthy reasons, is another. For ordinary people, anil 
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aYerage business men, know what has been and is hap-
pening in accident cases; and railroads know of it. Lay-
men may not know the philosophical or social reasons 
for the judicial evolution or revolution which has been 
and is occurring in tort liability law; but they observe 
its eonsequences in more and bigger judgments. As a 
consequence they very naturally try to protect them-
selves against hazards of financial loss, when possible, 
Ly rnrious methods including insurance, indemnity agree-
ments, and even insurance covering indemnity liabilities 
assumed by contract. Surely ths court is aware that 
what is said above is true. To erect judicial barricades 
against this natural and almost inevitable development 
in our society, due to some outworn hostility to enforce-
ment of indemnity agreements, simply because that hos-
tility may have had a moral basis in bygone days should 
not he the function of our courts. In other words, we 
respectfully submit to this court that developments in 
accident and tort liability law warrant a sensible and 
reafoitic mental approach by our courts in deciding these 
iml1'mnity cases, not a technical or hostile attitude. For 
if the doctrines of "enterprise liability" are more and 
more to be applied in negligence and accident cases, and 
we all know that is happening, then what is shocking or 
unfair or even harsh in holding to its bargain this def end-
ant company ·which agreed to accept indemnity liability 
iuC'ident to its enterprise'? 1Ve also respectfully ask this 
court to accept the modern and enlightened Yiews so well 
stated by .T udge Lynne in the L&N case first cited in this 
lJrief, and by the many other judges whose decisions 
h<ffe been ref erred to herein. To do otherwise would be 
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to inhibit, almost out of sheer superstition, the logical 
response of many members of our society to the develop-
ments and changes in tort liability law which go on 
about us apace. Cozzi v. Owens Corning Fiber Glass 
Corp. (N.J.) 164 A. (2d) 69. 
Plaintiff therefore asks this court to reverse the 
Summary Judgment against it ; and to direct judgment in 
the trial court granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the Issue of Liability. Should this court 
agree with us that defendant was not entitled to a Sum-
mary Judgment, but disagree with us that plaintiff is 
entitled to a Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liabil-
ity, then the judgment should be reversed and the case 
returned to the district court for trial. \Ve say in this 
latter regard, ho\vever, that we believe the real choices 
before this court are to affirm the judgment below or to 
direct the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff on 
the issue of liability, leaving to determination at a trial 
the amount of such liability. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH 
A. U. MINER 
HOWARD F. CORAY 
SCOTT 1\L MATHESON 
NORMANW. KETTNER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
404 Union Pacific Building 
Salt Lake Cit~-, Utah 
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